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From 1960 to the early 1990s, military satellites, including space-based communications, navigation, meteorology, early warning and, most important, strategic intelligence were developed and deployed by the two superpowers. Indeed, the dedicated military reconnaissance satellite systems, operated by the US and the Soviet Union from the early 1960s, constituted the most important technological development since thermonuclear weapons (with the possible exception of MIRVs). Early US satellite programmes, code named Corona, Samos, and Discoverer, were developed in response to perceived Soviet threats, following the testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile and the launch of Sputnik in 1957.2

During the 1950s, the US used high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft such as the U-2 to obtain information on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, but these aircraft were limited and, as was demonstrated dramatically in 1960, vulnerable to ground-based anti-aircraft missiles. Satellites in orbit were, in practice, invulnerable to attack, and the first successful Corona launch took place in August 1960. A combination of technological limitations in the development of anti-satellite systems, as well as tacit agreements between Washington and Moscow established the legitimacy of overhead reconnaissance through the use of satellites. 3

By 1972, when the Corona programme ended and was replaced by new technology, 94 satellites had been launched successfully.4 The satellites took thousands of photographs from orbit, after which retrorockets triggered the re-entry of the film capsule, which was recovered either in mid-air, or on the surface of the ocean.5 US reconnaissance satellites received hundreds of thousands of images, covering a wide variety of strategic and tactical targets, including Soviet and Chinese missile locations, the site of the detonation of the first Chinese atomic weapon.6 The Soviet Union developed similar systems shortly after the US, and, much later, the Chinese also produced reconnaissance satellites.

In the past two decades, these systems have been augmented by infra-red and broad spectrum imagery, space-based synthetic-aperture radar, and other technologies to allow for all-weather, all-hours imaging. In addition, navigation satellites allowed for increasing accuracy in a variety of platforms and kill-systems.

Satellites also became Non-intrusive Technical Means of verification (NTM). During the Cold War, the first stages of confidence building and information exchange between the US and USSR began tacitly and unilaterally through the use of overhead satellites.7 In the 1972 SALT and ABM agreements, the two sides formally agreed not to interfere with each other’s NTM.

Recently, satellite surveillance has been used increasingly in tactical warfare and regional conflicts, such as in the 1991 Gulf War and in the Balkans. Space-based imaging can provide targeting information in regional contexts, and the data is also useful for post-attack damage assessments. Just as satellite reconnaissance played a major role in the strategic balance during the Cold War, the same technology can be applied in the post-Cold War era of regional conflict.8

As analysis of the implications of these technical developments, and the potentially unrestricted policy regarding high-resolution commercial imaging satellites began, questions emerged. The issues include the impacts of such systems on regional conflicts, access by terrorists and rogue states. “With the increasing availability of civilian satellite imagery services, …what were once supersecret capabilities limited to the superpowers are becoming publicly accessible at affordable subscription rates.”9

Until the early 1990s, access to the images and to high-resolution satellite surveillance technology has been restricted to the major powers (the US, Russia, and China). Since then, France, India and Israel have acquired some capabilities in this area, and other states have announced programmes to develop this technology. In addition to the commercial sale of SPOT images, some photos provided by Russian military reconnaissance satellites were made available for purchase. In response to these developments,

The US government began to declassify many of the hundreds of thousands of images returned by military reconnaissance satellites, while at the same time, also loosening the restrictions on commercial licensing of high-resolution satellites systems. A number of U.S. firms, subsidised with contracts from the government, began to develop ambitious programmes, and in 1999, the IKONOS I satellite, with a GSD of 1 metre, was successfully launched into orbit, and started to return images.

In theory, the increased availability of high-resolution commercial space imaging services of the data that is transmitted can have positive as well as negative consequences. For the enthusiasts, this development will contribute not only economic but also political benefits, linked to transparency.

However, like many other technologies, these systems and the data are inherently dual-use, with both civil and military applications. Henry Sokolski includes satellites in a list of what he terms non-apocalyptic weapons and warns of the consequences had satellites been used by Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War.10 For the first time, many countries and non-governmental actors, in areas such as the Middle East, North Asia, Central Europe, and South America will have access to very detailed and almost real time images of neighboring states. Iran and Iraq will be able to obtain information and photos of strategic sites in the Persian Gulf, United States, Europe and Israel. A former CIA official notes, “The issue is going to heat up the first time we get a real crunch between two friends, like Pakistan and India.”11

The impacts, both stabilising and destabilising, will depend on a number of technical factors, including the resolution, the form in which the data is sold (original digital data, or derivatives), the nature of the distribution system (direct real-time ground links to receivers, or delayed transmission via filtering stations), available software, and similar factors. However, as Ray Wilson, of the George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute notes, “Iraq would be interested in information about Saudi Arabia. Iran would like to see data about Israel. India and Pakistan would like to have information about each other. If you were concerned about troop buildup on your border, you could put in a standing order for the satellite to take a picture every time it passed over.”12

Thus, it is clear that the implications of the proliferation of this technological capability, and the policy options for limiting the impact on security and stability should be carefully considered before these capabilities are widely available. In discussions and analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imaging, beyond the economic benefits, advocates frequently point to the increased transparency provided by this technology. However, high-resolution imaging satellites are dual-use technologies, and in making policies for the commercialisation of this technology, the potential impacts must be examined and understood.

The Impact on the Middle East¹³

In the high-conflict environment of the Middle East, the potential advantages of transparency are limited, and the negative impacts may be greater than the benefits. With the legacy of overlapping conflict zones (Arab-Israeli, Persian Gulf, Turkey-Syria, North Africa, etc.) and the resulting wars and terrorism, this is a region characterised by a high level of instability.

In this environment, the availability of timely information provided by high-resolution satellite images such as IKONOS will be used extensively for military intelligence. In the Middle East, efforts to negotiate arms control agreements and various confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs) to increase stability have not made significant progress. The meetings of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security between 1992-1994 ended in an impasse following Egyptian demands that Israel relinquish its deterrent capability. In the Middle East, the United Nations Arms Registry has made little headway, with most states either ignoring this voluntary measure towards transparency in conventional weapons, or only providing information that has been made available from other sources. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the use of satellites for verification of formal regional arms control agreements is likely to be limited.

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