In this context, the dual-use nature of
high-resolution satellites, with both military and civil applications, is
highlighted. Among the countries in the region, Israel is probably the most
sensitive to the dual-use impact of high-resolution commercial imaging
satellites. This sensitivity was expressed in the early 1990s, when the U.S.
government’s decision to remove the limitations on high-resolution commercial
imaging led to concern among Israeli defence officials regarding the impact on
national security. Israel’s very small territorial extent, which allows for
detailed and repeated coverage with a relatively limited number of images, makes
it vulnerable to attacks based on data accessible through commercial
high-resolution imaging satellites.
Its deterrence postureand strategy is based on maintaining a high degree of
uncertainty in the eyes of potential enemies, particularly with respect to the
nuclear and ballistic missile potential. Israeli policy makers feared that Arab
states, and Iran, as well as terrorist groups, would be able to exploit these
high-resolution images to obtain very detailed intelligence of Israeli
capabilities and deployments. Their ability to target Israeli sites with a high
degree of precision would alter the balance of power fundamentally, particularly
if these images were combined with GPS data to target cruise or ballistic
missiles.14
The military applications of commercial satellite imaging,
and the potential destabilising impact is not confined to the Middle East.
Indeed, the emergence of capabilities for receiving detailed images from the
battlefield, and distributing them (or analyses based on this data) directly and
immediately to the commanders on the battlefield, is increasingly recognised as
one of the major innovations in conventional warfare. In 1995, US Secretary of
Defence William Perry noted the central role that space forces play, stemming
from their “exceptional capabilities” for collecting, processing and
distributing data.
If regional powers, rogue states, and terrorist
groups have access to this data and capability, they will be able to exploit it
for the same purposes.15 U.S. government officials have increasingly recognised
the potential impact of the proliferation of this technology. Keith Hall,
Director of the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office, stated that “Real-time
imagery capabilities provided by E-O and other technologies is causing a
revolution in warfare.”16 In analysing the 1991 Gulf War, he noted “Satellite
reconnaissance was a major factor in the rapid US victory.” However, his public
statements do not address the impact on U.S. interests, allies or on regional
stability in areas such as the Middle East.
In contrast, other analysts
emphasise the destabilising impact of these capabilities on a global basis. For
example, “Islamic Jihad could get its hands on a one-metre resolution picture of
a US Air Force General’s headquarters in Turkey, convert the shot to a precise
three-dimensional image, combine it with data from a GPS device and transmit it
to Baghdad, where a primitive cruise missile, purchased secretly from China
could await its targeting coordinates.”17
Gupta notes that the impact
“depends on how the new remote sensing services will be distributed through the
political landscape, how belligerent states will use the high-resolution images,
and how observed states will respond to routine overhead imaging by their
neighbours.”18 He warns that unlimited sales of high-resolution imaging could
disrupt “delicate balances of power”, complicate the containment of
international crises, and fuel developments in offensive weapons capability.19
Similarly, former CIA director James Woolsey concludes, “This very comfortable
world people have been living in where fixed target installations on land are
safe” will vanish with the proliferation of high-resolution commercial
imaging.20 As noted above, the Middle East is characterised by a high level of
conflict, and instability is increased by a number of revisionist powers (Iraq,
Iran, Syria, Libya), as well as numerous terrorist groups with access to funds
and advanced technology, including the Bin Laden network. As a result,
high-resolution satellite imaging whether dedicated military platforms or
commercial systems, are viewed primarily in the context of their dual-use
nature. As will be seen in the following discussion, security concerns are the
foundation for Israel’s efforts to limit the distribution of high-resolution
images.
Commercial
Imaging Capabilities in the Middle East Israel has the most active and
advanced space programme in the region, including a dedicated military imaging
system (Ofeq), and the commercial EROS programme. The military establishments of
other countries which do not have the resources for dedicated reconnaissance
satellites, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran are likely to be major
customers for commercial imaging products, while applying the data to military
intelligence applications.
However, the market for civil applications of
high-resolution satellite imaging systems in the Middle East and Persian Gulf is
also significant. As in other regions, space-based imaging has long been used
for urban planning, location and identification of natural resources, including
water, (particularly in large and remote deserts), agriculture, and
environmental monitoring. In some of these applications, commercial
high-resolution imaging can be used to improve the efficiency. Egypt and Saudi
Arabia have developed an advanced infrastructure in civil applications of
remote-sensing, and the UAE has created a commercial centre to provide remote
sensing services (both military and civil) to the Arab and Islamic world (all
states in the region except Israel).
The Israeli Program
Israel has had an active and growing space programme for two decades. As in
the case of the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War, the environment of conflict
led Israel to develop imaging satellites capable of real-time intelligence.
The centrality of intelligence and early warning was emphasised as the countries
in the region began to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. On occasion, the U.S. shared strategic and space-based intelligence
information with Israel. However, despite the close defense cooperation with the
American government, Israel did not have routine access to real-time satellite
intelligence data. A Defence Ministry official was quoted saying “For years we
have been begging the Americans for more detailed pictures from their satellites
and often got refusals — even when Iraqi Scud missiles were falling on Tel
Aviv....”21 At times, the IDF has turned to other sources, including Russia,
which reportedly sold hundreds of satellite pictures of Syria, Iran and Iraq for
about $1 million, as part of a secret cooperation agreement.22
The
Middle East peace process and the transfer of territory to Egypt and the
Palestinian Authority has reduced Israel’s ability to rely on ground-based early
warning and intelligence installations, increasing the reliance on space-based
systems. This dependence will increase if Israel relinquishes the Golan Heights
to Syrian control, including the early-warning station on Mt. Hermon. Following
an agreement with Syria, Israel will need systems, including satellites, to
provide early warning of any Syrian military activity.