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Ambalat: A spatial and Technical Perspective
I Made Andi ARSANA School of Surveying and Spatial Information Systems The University of New South Wales Email: madeandi@student.unsw.edu.au Dr Clive SCHOFIELD Center for Maritime Policy University of Wollongong Email: clives@uow.edu.au Abstract During March 2005, the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia deteriorated. This was primarily related to the emergence of competing claims to the "Ambalat offshore area" located in the east of Borneo Island in the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea. The dispute resulted in strong reactions in both countries. This is understandable given the sensitive nature of disputes involving international boundaries, territory, sovereignty and sovereign rights. The response in Indonesia was particularly marked as a result of fears over further territorial losses in the aftermath of Malaysia's victory in the case concerning Sipadan and Ligitan islands with Indonesia in 2002. In this context it is therefore important for all concerned from both countries have to really understand the scientific, technical, and legal dimensions of the dispute. This paper discusses the case of Ambalat in a spatial and technical perspective. Theoretical maritime claims and potential maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia in Celebes Sea have been constructed using global chart data. GIS software, CARIS LOTS™ , was utilized as an assisting tool to generate baselines, maritime zone limits and maritime boundary lines for the two countries in a geodetically robust manner. The simulations spatially show the changes in Indonesia's and Malaysia's baselines resulting from the ICJ's decision to award Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia and the potential impact of these changes on maritime boundary delimitation based on equidistance. Conclusions are then drawn as to the relative merits of each State's claims in the Ambalat offshore area and the prospects for resolution of the dispute. 1. Introduction The dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over the Ambalat offshore area emerged in February 2005 as a result of overlaps in oil concession blocks issued by the two States. Energy security concerns are therefore an important factor in the dispute although the nationalist and patriotic sentiment underlying such sovereignty-related disputes cannot be ignored. Malaysia's national oil company, Petronas, granted licenses for exploration to deepwater Blocks ND6 and ND7 to its own exploration arm and Royal Dutch/Shell Group on 16 February 2005. Malaysia's new blocks largely overlap with Indonesia's Ambalat and East Ambalat Blocks, two blocks that had been licensed in 1999 and December 2004 to Italian and US oil companies ENI and Unocal. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed Malaysia's action "a violation of Indonesia's sovereignty" and warned Shell to stay out of Indonesian waters. Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar reacted by observing that Malaysia had itself dispatched similar protests to Jakarta over the earlier Indonesian-issued concessions. Both sides have protested over the other issuing licenses in the disputed area and urged their concession-holders to continue exploration work (Schofield, 2005). In response to the dispute mass demonstrations took place during March 2005 in some regions in Indonesia. The reaction of the Indonesian government and its people to Malaysia's awarding of the concession was comprehensible, given that the country is still smarting from the decision of the International Court of Justice to award Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia after a long and complex legal process (Arsana, 2005). Many of the arguments, pronouncements and declarations made in connection with the dispute, especially in the media, have, unfortunately, been emotional in character. Lack of comprehensive understanding provides potential for ill-advised or inadequately informed decision-making and undermines the chances of resolving the dispute. This paper aims to help to address this problem by providing a reasoned and objective analysis of the dispute. 2. Scope of the Research, Data and Software This paper covers several issues related to the Ambalat case between Indonesia and Malaysia. These include a brief overview of and introduction to international maritime boundary delimitation, Indonesian and Malaysian maritime claims and the status of their boundaries with one another, the location of the Ambalat offshore area, and options for dispute resolution including theoretical maritime delimitation scenarios. Analysis of the Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundaries in the Celebes Sea will involve consideration of the 1891 Convention between former colonial powers Britain and the Netherlands; the so-called 'Malaysian map' of 1979; Indonesia's maritime claims; and the latest status of Indonesia-Malaysia maritime boundaries in the Celebes Sea. Consideration of options for dispute resolution will involve technical examination of the definition of each State's baselines; definition of maritime limits; potential maritime boundary delimitations; and the possibility of establishing a maritime joint development area. This paper will close with conclusions and recommendations. Key data used in this research, particularly the generation of maritime limits and calculation of theoretical maritime boundaries are global data of the public domain World Vector Shoreline (WVS) at a nominal scale of 1:250000, obtainable from NASA. To process the data using Geographic Information System (GIS) approach, CARIS LOTS™ version 4.0 has been used. 3. International Maritime Boundaries: A Briefing International maritime boundaries are governed by public international law, especially the regime of the international law of the sea, now largely reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as LOSC) in 1982. The LOSC also defines the maritime zones a coastal state may claim. Maritime zones are measured from relevant baselines to a specified distance in the unit of nautical miles (NM), according to the type of maritime zone under consideration. The LOSC established the following maritime zones, each of which varies in the degree of exclusive rights and control afforded to a coastal state: internal waters (landward of baselines); archipelagic waters (within archipelagic baselines); territorial sea of up to a distance of 12 NM from baselines, contiguous zone up to 24 NM, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 NM and Continental Shelf usually to a limit of no more than 350 NM from relevant baselines . 4. Indonesia-Malaysia Boundaries 4.1. The Historical Evolution of the Boundary Before stepping into the Ambalat case proper, it is necessary to briefly look back to the historically development of the Indonesia-Malaysia boundary. This, undoubtedly, cannot be separated from the colonial history of Great Britain and the Netherlands over Borneo. A key consideration here is the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands to divide Borneo Island into two regions: the northern part was under The Great Britain's control and the southern part was the Netherlands'. Since the independence era, Malaysia has been the successor of Britain and Indonesia to the Netherlands' on Borneo. Thus, in defining their boundaries, especially their land boundaries, both countries have to refer back to the 1891 Convention. 4.2 The Sipadan and Ligitan Case On 17 December 2002 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its final and binding judgment on the case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan finding by 16 votes to one that Malaysia has sovereignty over the islands. The key factor which led the ICJ to award sovereignty to Malaysia, the Court having rejected both sides' arguments concerning treaty-based title to the islands, was the fact that Malaysia was able to demonstrate the stronger case in terns of effectivités - acts of administration demonstrating effective exercise of authority over the islands. The Sipadan and Ligitan case still resonates in Indonesia. The loss of territory is keenly felt by any State but especially so for Indonesia in the aftermath of the 'loss' of East Timor in 1999. The reaction was exacerbated by the fact that the Indonesian government and media had not prepared the public for the possibility of defeat so that the loss was largely unexpected. 4.3. The Malaysian Map of 1979 In 1979, Malaysia published a new map in two sheets illustrating Malaysia's claimed land territory and limits of its maritime claims, notably territorial sea and continental shelf. The map was created unilaterally and stimulated protests from its neighbors because its claim excessively discount third countries' maritime territories (Haller-Trost, 1998: 7). Indonesia sent protest note in February 1980 concerning the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. This was followed by the Philippines regarding the reef southern of the Spratly Island and China for the same reason. Singapore sent its protest in April 1980 referring to the Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Puteh). Protests were also sent by Thailand, UK on behalf of Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan. Figure 1 below depicts a part of sheet 2 of the controversial map.  Figure 1 The Malaysian Map of 1979 (Haller-Trost, 1998: 486) 4.4 Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Celebes Sea According to Villanueva (2005), the overlapping claims of territorial sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf around the Ambalat offshore area in the Celebes Sea have not yet been delimited. In the first instance such delimitation should be achieved through bilateral negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia. Jinangkung (2005) has stated that Indonesia has been ready to conduct any negotiation and even already started the negotiation on 22 March 2005 with Malaysia. Even though it seemed to be related to Ambalat case, he asserted that the negotiation was a scheduled negotiation and would generally discuss Indonesia-Malaysia unresolved boundaries in the three locations: Malacca Strait, South China Sea and Celebes Sea. However, the results of the latest negotiation have not been published, at least until the time of writing. The negotiation processes are, however, understood to be ongoing. 5. The Ambalat Block Many people are not fully aware of the position of the Ambalat offshore area. Some even do not realize that Ambalat is not an island but an offshore area as well as the name associated with two Indonesian oil exploration blocks located in the east of Borneo. The Ambalat offshore area referred to in this case is the overlapping area claimed by Indonesia and Malaysia between Indonesia's existing Ambalat and East Ambalat and Malaysia's Block ND6 and ND7. According to discussion on this matter in an internet-based community, RSGIS Forum, Ambalat is a block roughly located in area within the coordinates of 118°15'21" - 118°51'15" E and 2°34'7" - 3°47'50" N. This means Ambalat extends approximately 65 km from West to East and 135 km from South to North The block is thus situated south of the final segment of the land boundary line crossing Sebatik Island. Figure 2 below illustrates the location of Ambalat and its position relative to Sipadan and Ligitan Islands.  Figure 2 Ambalat, Sipadan, and Ligitan 6. Dispute Resolution A bilateral mutual agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia is required to resolve the maritime boundary dispute. It is obvious that the Ambalat case is a maritime boundary conflict because Indonesia and Malaysia claim the same maritime zones (resulting in a zone of overlapping claims) where the block situates. Villanueva (2005) asserted that this is not a case of a dispute over sovereignty but one where sovereign rights to explore and exploit maritime zone and natural resources deposited are at issue. 6.1. Baselines Definition It has to be anticipated that Malaysia, by law, changes its baseline configuration because Sipadan and Ligitan are now officially its. Defining Indonesia and Malaysia's baselines in Celebes Sea represents the first step towards delimitation as each State's maritime zones are measured from their baselines. Indonesia will, of course, preserve its archipelagic baselines. The old and new configuration of Indonesia and Malaysia's baselines are represented in figure 1 and 2. The yellow lines in Figure 1 depict the old configuration of baselines where Indonesia considered Sipadan and Ligitan as its basepoints. For the purposes of this analysis Malaysia is shown employing normal baselines. Figure 2 illustrates the new configuration of baseline where Indonesia no longer considers Sipadan and Ligitan as its basepoints, meanwhile Malaysia keeps the old baseline configuration.  Figure 3 New configurations of baselines 6.2. Definition of EEZ and Continental Shelf Boundary The second step is to define the boundary for EEZ and Continental Shelf. It will be found that the Ambalat offshore area is situated within EEZ and Continental Shelf claims of both States. The case deals with territorial sea and EEZ. However, due to seabed resources at stake, continental shelf will probably be a major focus in negotiations. 6.3 Maritime Boundary Delimitation The overlapping claim in the EEZ and Continental Shelf requires maritime boundary delimitation. In this context the application of the equidistance/median line method of delimitation to has been widely accepted in both State practice and case law, at least as a starting point. Subsequently, the contributing factors/aspects need to be taken into consideration in order to achieve an equitable solution. In this case, the two islands of Sipadan and Ligitan are likely to play a significant role in maritime boundary delimitation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Different effects or weightings can be applied to the islands to determine how the line can be influenced. Figure 2 shows the equidistance line with zero effect given to Sipadan and Ligitan. Figure 3 illustrates the full effect given to Sipadan and Ligitan causing the shift of equidistance line southwards closer to Indonesia's side.  Figure 4 Full effect applied to Sipadan and Ligitan In the Indonesia's point of view, giving less effect to the two islands would be preferable. The keys are reasons that can confidently convince Malaysia and/or third party if the case is submitted to the third party. Other factors that need to be considered are proportion of coastal length involved, and socio-economic development of both sides. 6.4 The possibility to establish Joint Development Area If the delimitation divides Ambalat into two different parts, each country can only explore and exploit its own part. Another possibility is to establish a Joint Development Area (JDA), similar to what agreed by Indonesia and Australia in the Timor Gap. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have had experienced establishing JDA and all of these have proved successful. "Indonesia, in partnership with Australia, was the author of the hugely complex and ground-breaking joint zone governing the Timor Gap area (now partially taken over by Timor Leste post-independence); and Malaysia through two joint development area agreements with Thailand and Vietnam respectively". (Schofield and Arsana, 2005) There are at least three reasons supporting the idea of a JDA: it avoids delays due to deadlock in negotiations, it is flexible, and finally it is in line with the LOSC. Opting for a JDA can lead to Indonesia and Malaysia avoiding a time consuming and costly delimitation exercise. This approach is also flexible in terms of area, duration and resource or function applied to. Finally, joint zones are in line with international law with the Law of the Sea Convention stating in Articles 74 and 83 relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf that: "Pending agreement...the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final agreement. Such agreements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation." 7. Conclusions Having considered the above analysis, it can be concluded that:
Acknowledgement We thank to Chris Rizos, who has provided facilities for this research and travel grant for the conference. References
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