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Flood damage: How prepared are we?

R. Rangachari
Former, member (Floods and River Management),
Central Water Commission, and visiting Research Professor, CPR


Humanity has lived with floods for centuries but the impact of floods was not felt to the same extent in the in the past as is experienced now. Rapid increase in population and urbanization coupled with increased economic and developmental activities together with the nonregularisable river bed colonization have resulted in the hazardous occupation of the floods plains to an ever increasing extent. India is subject to monsoon, which accounts for the rainfall. In our region the monsoon period is between July and September and three-fourth of the monsoon rain in any year is concentrated within rain in any year is concentrated within about 100 hours of intense downpour. Floods are common occurrences, particularly in the Brahmaputra and Ganga (including the Yamuna) basins. However, the actual intensity and the extent of flooding as also the flood damages vary from year to year.

Delhi lies within the Yamuna sub basin of the Ganga sytem, which itself is a part of the greater Ganga Brahmaputra Mega basin. River Yamuna rises in the Himalaya at Yamunotri in UP. The uamuna receives many tributaries before it debouches into the plains near Tajewala. It then travels Generally along the UP - Haryana border before it reaches Delhi state. It traverses some 40km. in Delhi and has an average bed width varying from two to three km. thereafter the river runs again through UP and joins the Ganga near Allahabad.

Delhi state has flat land, however there is a big depression in the southwest known as the Najafgarh jheel area, which receives the drainage from the adjoining states of Haryana and Rajasthan. The only outlet for these waters is the Yamuna.

The Sahib river that flows through Rajasthan and Haryana used to be absorbed in the sandy areas of Haryana and has no definite course downstream of Masani in Haryana. The waters of the Sahibi flow into Delhi through the Dhansa bund. The waters find a final outlet in to the Yamuna (throught eh Najafgarh nala) below wazirabad. There are barrages across the Yamuna in Delhi at Wazirabad, Indraprastha and Okhla. There are also some 18 drains that join the Yamuna in Delhi. Delhi's flooding is due to
  • Spills from the Yamuna
  • Drainage congestion due to intense rainfall
  • Flooding from various drains of Haryana and the Sahibi nadi.
Delhi state covers an area of 1483 sq. km. its population, which was less than half a million in 1911 now cross 14 million. Delhi has experienced many high floods in the past, but the effects were not so significant as the population was small and rural. With increased population, particularly after the partition in 1947, the damages have been high. It will be a convenient starting point to review the flood scene in the last five decades, after India attained its independence. In fact statistical compilations relating to flood incidences are available since 1953 only.

Between 1953 and 1990, the period for which published damages data are available, there were high floods in Delhi 1in 1956, 1958, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1988. Prior to 1953 there were such floods in 1924 and 1947. Since 1990 the floods of 1995 were high. The highest flood level on record so far was in 1978, through the Yamuna. The 1924 floods, which comprised successive peaks of lesser order, had generated the largest volume of flood flows so far. The 1977 flood was the highest through the Sahibi nadi.

Flood damage figures are reported by the Delhi state administration and these have been compiled by Central Water Commission. Taking these as reflecting the true position some inferences could be drain. The maximum area that was affected in Delhi was 70,000 ha of which 40,000 ha were stated to be under crops and this was in 1978. A million people were reportedly affected. Some 400 heads of cattle and 18 human lives were lost. The total damage to crops, houses and public utilities was put at around 18 crores rupees. Int eh 1977 floods, which was next in order of magnitude, the total damage was put at over Rupees five crores. A damage of comparable order earlier was in 1967.

The expenditure incurred in planned flood control works in Delhi between 1951 and 1955 is around Rs 185crores. It is reported that under th Plans, 83 km of embankments were built and 453 km. of drainage channels made, benefiting come 78,000 ha. of land. The expenditure figures relating to unplanned relief are not available.

Experience ahs shown that the loss of human life and property could be reduced considerably by giving reliable advance information about the oncoming floods. The Government of India's involvement in flood forecasting and warning activiti4es as initiated with the Nation's capital. A beginning with scientific flood forecasting was made by the Central Water Commission in late 1958 and the first forecast relating to the water level at old Railway bridge at Delhi across the Yamuna was issued on 25th July 1959. After the Sahibi Floods of 1964 a second site was started for the Dhansa Regulator on the Sahibi. This network now covers some 157 flood forecasting stations in India. As a part of modernization of flood forecast systems under CWC, considerable improvements were made in the forecasting set up for the Delhi Railway Bridge in the eighties with automatic data connection, telemetering and INSAT satellite system.

The danger level at Delhi Railway bridge was indicated to be 204.83 meters and warnings area issued for likely water levels of over 204 meters. What is this magic number 204.83 m? it would appear to be no real magic. It was considered by Delhi administration in the 1950s that water level in the Yamuna higher than 672 feet above mean sea level could lead to damages. So 672 feet it was. As India switched to the metric system, some one meticulously converted the figure in FPS units to 204.83m. strictly speaking, a periodic examination of the changes in the river configuration and flow pattern is required on the basis of upto date records. This should take note of the embanking and other changes made in the upstream reaches as also the estent of instruction into the flood plains by structures, economically important installations etc. Thereafter, a fresh determination of the danger level at various locations should be done. We are not sure that this had been done. Every indication is that this has not been done. We know that much embanking upstream has been made and many gaps closed, greater intrusion into the flood plains has occurred and vast urbanization has taken place on the eastern side the Yamunapar area.

The vast changes in the ground situation since the last high flood of 1978 have many serious adverse implications for Delhi. It has been observed in recent years that the water levels at Delhi for lesser magnitudes of flow are higher than in the past. The nest "high flood" in the Yamuna could have very serious consequences for the nations capital area.

In 1978, a discharge of 15,690 cumec (5.54 lakh cusec) was estimated to have crossed Tajewala on 3rd September morning. However soon thereafter no more observations were possible as the observation post was abandoned and staff evacuated on considerations of safety. There were son many breaches lower down and spills occurred. Estimates by various experts of the peak discharge then attained at Tajewala varied from 18,000 to 26,400 cumec. One does not know that the likely position would be next time. A workshop sponsored by CWC and organized by CBIP in January, 1986 to consider the design discharge for structures and embankments on the Yamuna in Delhi noted the "grave risk involved in any underestimation of the stakes to the life and property of nearly 2 million people who were then living in trans - Yamuna area which was solely dependent on the safety of the left embankments". There are many who consider that the magnitude and water level of the next 'high flood' could be of an order higher than that recorded in 1978.

We can sum up the flooding possibilities and related problems:
  1. In 1978, there was only a small settlement in east Delhi. This has changed. Now nearly half of the over 14 million people of Delhi cupying low lying areas. In the past, Government tended to take care of the portion west of the river and was willing to accept serious breaches in the eastern side. This option is no more available. The maintenance of embankments is also far from satisfactory with grave risk of colossal losses should the left side embankments fail.
  2. There is significant intrusion in the river bed and flood plain, much of which seems politically organized and Government condoned. This impermissible occupation is constantly on the increase. There are even some Government sponsored schemes of this nature. The DDA plan for channelization of the Yamuna and commercial use of the reclaimed area, should be viewed in this context. The CWC/CBIP workshop of 1986 had the following to say on the proposal for channelisation and urban development as was then envisaged : "the proposal … was not considered to be sound prima facie on technical considerations. Further is came in direct conflict with the declared policy of flood plain zoning by the government of India for preventing encroachment on flood plains in order to minimize flood losses in terms of money and human lives…………."
  3. It is a common tendency to blame the upstream states for high floods in a downstream state. "High release from Tajewala" have often been blamed for Delhi's flood problems. This will be meaningless in the absence of any storage provided at Tajewala, or any other location upstream till now. The January , 1986 workshop recommended construction of storages at upstream sites in U.P./H.P to significantly help in floor moderation as also meet the increasing water requirements in Delhi. It also suggested use of detention basins, overflow sections and diversions upstream.
  4. Delhi's Problems have been compounded by the inability of the State Government to ensure the effective implementation of the agreed Sahibi Master Plan. Nothing of real significance and beneficial to Delhi from that agreed Master Plan has been implemented in the upstream States, in the past three decades. The risk to Delhi through the Sahibi in thus continues.
  5. Most of the recommendations of the Rashtriya Barh Ayog have remained only in paper. Nothing that was agreed upon and retreated from time to time has been implemented. Therefore, the extent of damages in the case of a future flood of even the same order as in the past will be much higher. Leaving aside the prospects of Disaster mitigation following a "high flood" of the future, the handling of the much lesser order of flows and normal drainage during spells of rain in recent years point out the many deficiencies in the "system". One has only to go through recent news reports to realize this.
  6. the multiplicity of organizations involved, along with the less than involvement of the state Government of Delhi and its elected legislators in terms of its present constitutional position are added problems.
Where do we go from here? Rather than bemoaning the difficult situation as it stands now, we could offer some suggestions for the consideration of the Delhi Government (in consultation with the Central Government).
  1. A committee should be set up by the Delhi Administration to review the position in regard to a possible flood disaster and the readiness or otherwise if the present setup and arrangements to deal with it. This should involve both government level and non governmental experts working together in the review.
  2. A review of the progress in the implementation of the agreed Sahibi master plan should be undertaken and actions to update and expedite implementation decided upon. At least those elements of concern to Delhi should be urgently implemented.
  3. A review of the danger level, status of flood embankments including those upstream, the condition of the flood plain and the encroachments thereunto should be undertaken. Areas at risk with different probability levels of floods should be demarcated on large scale maps and these should be made easily available to the common man. Effective enforcement of flood plain zoning through legislation would significantly help.
  4. A careful review, with informed public participation after wider dissemination of the plans under contemplation, of the proposal for the channelisation of the Yamuna river in Delhi must be undertaken.
  5. A standing committee of experts to advice the government, including representatives of NGOs and active members of the public should be set up on flood management relating to Delhi and the wider National Capital Region.
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