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Politics and performance:
The implications of emerging governance arrangements for urban management approaches and
information systems
2.1 Political arrangements for urban governance
In authoritarian political systems, local government typically had a number of common
characteristics (Ruland 1992):
- Capital cities were brought directly under central government political or
administrative control (and in fact central control of some cities, such as Buenos Aires
and Mexico City, survived democratisation) (Nickson 1995)
- Local elections were generally abolished or suspended
- Local government (generally via appointed officials) was used to consolidate the
power of the central government – it had only a support role in urban development
and no decision making autonomy and the extent to which it delivered services was
related to the national government’s need for support from the urban population.
Examples have been documented from Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines
(Ruland 1992), Latin America (Nickson 1995) and Mozambique (Alexander 1997;
Swilling 1997).
- Regime-sponsored neighbourhood organisations were created to increase control,
disseminate the ideology of central government and suppress political dissent. For
example, in the Philippines barangays were effectively arms of the security agencies
(Ruland 1992), while in one-party states the neighbourhood organisations were
branches of the political party (Swilling 1997; Clarke and Buys 1999).
- Social movements, regime-critical NGOs and self-help organisations were stigmatised
and persecuted. However, while independent NGOs were limited by legislative
means or repression, government-sponsored NGOs were often encouraged (for
example in Indonesia and Thailand) (Korff 1986; Porio 1997).
Thus in authoritarian regimes, local government was used not merely to consolidate the
power of central government but also to contribute to the de-politicisation of society by tight
grassroots control (Ruland 1992). Change occurred as a result of internal collapse of the
regime, changing social and economic conditions, economic liberalisation and/or the
emergence of social movements. The new political arrangements established at both national
and local urban levels following democratisation were, with few exceptions, formal
representative democracies based on the theoretical assumptions of liberal democratic theory
(Held 1996).
In such political systems
“.. liberalism determines the nature of the state (formal, abstract), its structure
(separate from the autonomous civil society, a clear separation between public and
private), its rationale (protection of the basic rights of its citizens) and its basic units
(individuals rather than groups or communities). Democracy specifies who
constitutes the legitimate government and wields the authority inherent in the state
(the elected representatives), how they acquire authority (free elections, choice
between parties) and how they are to exercise it (in broad harmony with public
opinion)” (Parekh 1993)(p.165).
However, in addition to the widely recognised problems with such systems, the difficulties
experienced in consolidating formal representative democracy in previously authoritarian or
oligarchical regimes have provoked doubts about the applicability of political models based
on these assumptions, rules and institutions to countries in the South. Even in well-established
democracies there is a danger that voting becomes merely a means of selecting
between competing elites for leadership, leads to tyranny of the majority and
disenfranchisement of minorities and can be manipulated to sustain oligarchic rule.
Moreover, it is difficult to ensure accountability of a complex and entrenched bureaucracy,
citizenship is seen as essentially passive (except during periodic elections) and equality of
political power is undermined by socio-economic inequality (Miller 1993; Held 1996).
An additional problem in new democracies is the liberal definition of individuals as
essentially self-contained persons, protection of whose rights is the primary purpose of the
political system, in societies where individuals are defined in communal terms. In many
societies, social groups believe that their members’ individual rights can and should be
legitimately restricted; freedom, equality, loyalty, power and authority are conceptualised
differently; and representation tends therefore to be communal, and to oblige an individual to
distribute the state resources to which political office gives access to members of his or her
social group (Parekh 1993; Preston 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Further, the winner/loser
system is thought to sit badly with the culture of consensus and competitive multi-party
elections to be divisive, especially where parties are not formed around policy platforms and
electoral discourse is consequently forced back on personal characteristics and local (often
ethnic) identity, one of the problems which led to the replacement of earlier multi-party
democracies in the first place (Allen 1995; Hodder-Williams 1999). The tendency of a
democratic system to focus on leadership choices based on elite competition or membership
of ascriptive groups is exacerbated by inhibitions on political participation by the poor, the
weakness or lack of autonomy of civil society (Attahi 1997) and the inadequacy of (or lack of
control over) state resources to implement domestically determined political agendas
(Abrahamsen 2000). Finally, the relationship of democratic institutions to other authority
structures and their influence on state-society relations is often problematic, especially in
Africa (Mamdani 1996; Sklar 1999; Hyden 2000). As a result, in Latin America, for example,
opinion polls in the late 1990s showed that only 27% of the population had confidence in
existing democratic institutions (UNCHS 2001, p.66).
These problems are replayed in cities and towns when democratic government is (re-)
constituted at the urban level. However, their form, the ways in which some of the problems
have been tackled and their implications for urban government vary between countries. To
understand the political system and processes at the urban level, it is necessary to identify the
key political actors, ascertain how they perceive their interests and seek explanations of how
they act. In ten cities studied in a recently completed research programme, the actors playing
an important role were found to include (Devas et al. 2001):
Politicians and political parties. Mayors may be symbolic (in systems modelled originally
on the UK) or executive. If the latter, these politicians are the most significant actors at the
city level, but elected councillors and national/state politicians may also be important.
Elected executive mayors wield considerable power and may be responsive to the needs of
poor residents if their votes count. Successive mayors in Cebu City in the Philippines, for
example, have depended on electoral support from poor residents but the picture with respect
to delivery on their campaign promises is mixed (Etemadi 2000). Appointed chief executives
are not locally accountable – in Kumasi, Ghana, the appointed mayor is able to override
elected Assembly members (Devas and Korboe 2000). Political parties rarely have a
coherent policy platform; instead they are treated by aspirants to political office as a means of
organising and delivering the necessary votes (see also (Pasteur 1996; Mengers 1997).
Public sector agencies, including both local and higher levels of government. Bureaucracies
and their staff often promote their own agendas (self interest, professional standards),
resisting or subverting local political decision making; and co-ordinating action is often
hindered by competition between agencies. The division of responsibilities, power and
resources between central and local government is an important determinant of the latter’s
ability to respond to local priorities and needs, as is the extent to which semi-autonomous
bodies are responsible for the delivery of essential services. Where local government is
overshadowed by parastatals accountable to higher level political and administrative levels,
municipal capacity is likely to be undermined. These issues are discussed further below.
NGOs. These may undertake their own developmental initiatives, generally on a small scale
and with limited impact on wider decision making; provide services for the government,
potentially sacrificing their independence to access funds; act as intermediaries between
residents and public sector agencies; support local associations of residents or micro-entrepreneurs;
or campaign for civil rights and political participation (Douglass 1998; Desai
and Preston 2000). Studies in the ten cities referred to above and elsewhere have found that
NGOs tend to be small, to adopt competitive rather than collaborative ways of operating, and
to have weak links with each other, poor residents and the political structures. As a result,
they are, in practice, rarely influential political actors (Acharya and Thomas 1999; Sahley and
Danziger 1999; Devas et al. 2001).
Trade unions often played an important role in struggles against authoritarian rule, but they
are primarily concerned to protect the interests of their members, who are not the poorest
workers. Changes, for example to arrangements for municipal service delivery, may be
resisted by the unions of municipal workers (as in South Africa and India) (Franceys and
Sansom 1999; Dutta 2000; Beall et al. 2001). Overall, the pressures of globalisation and
liberalisation have weakened trade unions in most countries.
Enterprises and their associations range along a continuum from large scale enterprises, the
significance of which to the local economy is such that they may wield systemic power
without needing to enter into explicit political alliances, to micro-enterprises, which can
rarely influence decision making to their advantage without organisation. Whether
organisations such as Kumasi’s market traders (King et al. 2001) or Cebu’s street vendors
and trisikad drivers can influence political decision making in their own favour depends on
whether the changes for which they are pressing compete with the interests of other groups,
especially large scale enterprises (Etemadi 2001). The latter have, for example, backed
clearances of street vendors from city centre streets at various times in Kumasi, Mombasa,
Cebu and Colombo (Refs).
Associations range from informal groups based on identity or voluntary membership to
formal associations. They may or may not have a political agenda and influence (see also
Tripp on Dar es Salaam)(Tripp 1997).
Residents can exert power and influence over decision making only through their votes or the
culture of personal contacts within the political or bureaucratic systems, unless they are
organised into associations around their area of residence or interests, which raises a number
of issues about leadership. This can be formal or loose and informal, unified or fragmented
and competitive, and motivated by altruism or self interest. Ward and Chant distinguish four
main categories of community leadership with different degrees of legitimacy, different
propensities to mobilise and act and different relations with the local state. They also note
that typically not all interests are represented by community leaders – in particular the
interests of women are often under-represented (Ward and Chant 1987) (see also Sahley and
Danziger1999 on Lima). Rodriguez and Winchster, reviewing the Latin American
experience, identify the conditions for participation of the ‘popular social classes’ in
government as, firstly, the existence of popular organisations with some presence at the local
level, and secondly, the occupation of positions in the municipality by parties or individuals
(especially mayors) favourable to participation (Rodriguez and Winchester 1996). There is
some evidence that pro-poor policies are more likely to be politically viable if universalistic
initiatives that benefit all groups are pursued (e.g. primary education for all, malaria
reduction) rather than targeted poverty reduction initiatives (Blair 2000).
Power and influence is exercised through political strategies and practices which may relate
to the formal political structure or be played out through informal relationships. The key
aspects are representation and accountability. The latter will be discussed further below.
With respect to the former, the question is how and whether the representative mechanisms
represent the interests of different social groups.
Conceptions of the purpose of ‘representation’ influence how elected representatives behave
once in office: whether they further the interests of their financial backers or known
supporters, fulfil their electoral promises, advance their own political careers or line their
own pockets. Where there were significant concentrations of poor people in the ten cities
studied and ward-based elections, some indicated greater responsiveness by councillors to
their constituents than in at-large electoral systems, especially those with a closed party list
(Devas et al. 2001; see also Nickson 1995). In Bangalore, for example, ward councillors are
accessible and accountable to poor voters, who bargain their votes for the benefits that
councillors can deliver, reflected in much higher electoral turnouts in low than higher income
wards (Benjamin 2000). However, systems of proportional representation, or mixed systems
as in Johannesburg (Beall et al. 2001) or Venezuela (Nickson 1995) may give better
representation to minorities. Quota systems in which a proportion of seats are reserved, as in
India or the Philippines, attempt to ensure that groups such as women and minorities are
adequately represented, but the accountability of such representation is not always certain
(Blair 2000).
Political decisions are strongly influenced by the short time horizons of the political process.
Short term, visible projects take precedence over the longer term, more mundane or less
visible tasks required to improve service delivery and infrastructure maintenance,
operationalise regulatory frameworks or improve municipal organisational capacity. Rules
on terms of office (frequency of elections, length of term, eligibility for re-election etc) are,
therefore, potentially important and can be changed to overcome some of the worst effects of
inordinately short political time horizons, although the operational modes of public agencies
must also recognise the legitimate political need for visible results.
Finally, city or metropolitan government is remote from residents, giving rise to a democratic
deficit which may be overcome by instituting representative systems at a sub-city level,
although councillors may resist if they see these as a threat (Jalal 2000). Cebu’s barangays
and Recife’s micro-regions are examples of accessible elected bodies that influence decisions
on expenditure at both city and local levels and can respond to local priorities, in the latter
through participatory budgeting (Souza 2000; Devas et al. 2001; Etemadi 2001). Some of the
ten municipalities in Abidjan introduced neighbourhood management councils or committees
to ensure more participatory management of local services (Attahi 1999).
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