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Politics and performance:
The implications of emerging governance arrangements for urban management approaches and
information systems
2.2 Decision making
In theory, in a democratic political system, decisions are made by the elected leaders or
representatives in general accordance with public opinion. The role of government
bureaucracies is to provide decision makers with sufficient information to enable them to
make informed choices, while ensuring that the rule of law and government procedures
designed to ensure fiscal balance, accountability and efficient performance are adhered to.
The operation and maintenance of services, exercise of regulatory functions, management of
revenue collection and expenditure, and management of personnel are, in practice, especially
in large cities, both complex and routine. The issue of delegation is, therefore, important:
what are the strategic policy choices and management decisions that should be taken by
elected politicians and what can more sensibly be delegated to bureaucrats; what should be
the structure and role of the executive and the legislature; and is decision making by a limited
number of elected representatives sufficient to reflect the views of diverse urban populations?
In addition, given the (increased) dispersal of functions to organisations outside local
government, how can decision making that involves a number of different central and local
government and non-government bureaucracies best be handled?
The arrangements for executive control are important: an elected executive mayor may
deliver more decisive city government and clearer accountability than an executive council
system, but the checks and balances may be fewer and the risks greater than in a system
where councillors have both legislative and executive powers. Whether that is the case
depends on the scrutiny powers available to the legislature and its ability to exercise them, as
well as on the management arrangements, especially the tradition of confidence appointments
(Nickson 1995; Pasteur 1996; Batley 1997; Devas et al. 2001). The political and
administrative relationships between central and local government are also important.
The limitations of both state organisations and formal structures of representative democracy
have increasingly been recognised. Although the design of these structures can be adapted to
improve decision making, as briefly discussed above, introduction of the mechanisms of
direct, deliberative or participatory democracy is increasingly advocated (Miller 1993; Held
1996; Smith and Blanc 1997). These are based on more active notions of citizenship and
complement representative democracy rather than replacing it. In addition, decentralisation
and the division of responsibilities between increasing numbers of agencies has led to
increased recognition of the need for negotiated agreements between actors, perhaps along
the lines of French contrats de ville (UNCHS 2001). One form these attempts at more
inclusive negotiated decision making has taken is collaborative planning (Healey 1997;
Rakodi 2000)
An example is the City Development Strategy process promoted by UNCHS, UNDP and the
World Bank through the Urban Management Programme, which also broadens the traditional
view of an urban plan as a land use plan to a multi-sectoral strategic development plan with
links to implementation. The CDS process is intended to arrive at a shared view of priorities,
produce more appropriate policies, widen ownership of decisions and result in more action
than traditional approaches to policy formulation and planning. Ideally, the political process
should be capable of doing all these things and where democracy is consolidated, the CDS
process can be integrated into regular decision making practices, increasing the likelihood of
implementation. Where it operates parallel to and slightly outside the regular government
structure, as in Dar es Salaam, its acceptability and effectiveness are more problematic
(Kombe 2001). However, it should not be assumed that agreement on priorities and
consensus on policies and actions is possible or that all have equal influence – even in
attempts at inclusive decision making, it is likely that some interests will be excluded or
marginalised (Rakodi 2002).
In none of the ten cities referred to above had a CDS process been instituted at the time of
study, but a number of other extensions to the formal representative system were observed.
These included integration of organised interests into political structures, as in Recife, Cebu
and Johannesburg; formal consultation of interests (Pasteur 1996); involvement of users in
service management; and participatory democracy at the neighbourhood level, as in Colombo
(under the former Million Houses Programme) and in participatory budgeting in Recife or
Porto Alegre (Russell and Vidler 2000; Souza 2000; Abers 2001). Such plural structures and
mechanisms of representation can ensure that the views of the poor are heard in policy
making, programme design and implementation, especially at a project or area level. The Ley
de Participatión Popular in Bolivia introduced a plural representative system which includes
democratic decentralisation at municipal level and recognises CBOs. The latter send
representatives to a Vigilance Committee which has powers to hold municipalities to account.
However, Blair notes that men’s rather than women’s groups are recognised where both exist
and occupational groups are not represented (Blair 2001). Similarly, a case study of the
Community Development Forum in Diepsloot, Johannesburg showed that some poor groups
are excluded (Beall et al. 2001).
The danger with forms of direct democracy, such as referenda, is that they over-simplify
issues and exacerbate the tyranny of the majority that is already a danger of many formal
representative democratic systems. Deliberative and participatory democracy may also be
problematic. On advisory bodies government nominees tend to have more information and
influence than residents, while citizen representatives may fail to report back or become
incorporated into the agency’s perspective (Smith 2000). Participation may be irregular and
selective, not inclusive; may function merely to legitimate decisions taken by the authorities;
and may create tensions with councillors, professionals and other bureaucrats (Smith and
Blanc 1997). ‘Partnerships’ are task or area specific, time-limited and often conceal unequal
power relationships. Although they have positive aspects, therefore, they are not a substitute
for the ongoing city-wide activities of government (UNCHS 2001).
2.3 Accountability
Accountability mechanisms in the public sector are essential to hold to account those who
hold the public trust and to ensure quality control and probity (Olowu 1999). However,
absolute control is unnecessary, infeasible and inefficient, so there is a difficult boundary to
be drawn at the limits of discretion. In theory, elected municipal government is more easily
held to account than national government because it is physically relative accessible, local
politicians are relatively active and numerous and there are likely to be local media (Davey
1996). Accountability may be achieved by internal and external mechanisms, as well as
political voice (Olowu 1999). These are underpinned by transparency with respect to
procedures and information.
Internal mechanisms include, for example, merit-based recruitment and reward systems,
codes/regulations, and internal reviews and audits. External mechanisms include
administrative responsibility to the political executive (although collusion can instead
encourage corruption and reduce efficacy) (Mengers 1997), judicial channels and legislatures.
In practice, legislatures are often not good at holding the executive to account, because they
may also have executive functions (especially in the British model), party systems are
fragmented and unstable (Blair 2000), or members of the legislature broker patron-clientelistic
relations between the mayor or bureaucrats and their constituents (Nickson
1995). More recent initiatives include ombudsman-like institutions and independent scrutiny
bodies. Finally, central government regulation is important but is generally either too heavy-handed
and controlling, or ineffective because of limited capacity or political alliances
between central and local politicians and bureaucrats (Haque 1997; Blair 2000).
Voice exercised through the electoral system is an effective way of ensuring accountability if
voter registration and turnout is universal (or at least widespread) and the ratio of elected
representatives to the population is adequate (Nickson 1995). However, elections may only
legitimise the power of the local elite (Haque 1997), they are occasional and if competition is
based on alternative policies at all, these are very broad and general. Voice may be
supplemented by public meetings, the media (although local media often lack the resources
for investigative journalism), the activities of civil society organisations and opinion
surveys/referenda (Campbell 1997; Paul and Sekhar 1997). Systematic public feedback
makes it more difficult for agencies to dismiss complaints as anecdotal and provides a
weapon for citizens and watchdog organisations.
A variety of mechanisms of accountability were observed in the cities studied by Devas et al,
ranging from elections, through voice (public meetings, a free media), to the exercise of
controls internally by the executive and/or legislature and externally by government. The
mechanisms were not studied in detail but clearly varied in their effectiveness and
accessibility to the poor (Devas et al. 2001). Blair asserts that those accountability
mechanisms with the most links (civil society organisations and political parties) are more
important, although he fails to unpack and specify his broad definition of civil society. He
concludes that renewed local democracy initially provides opportunities for elite challenge
and only in some cases leads to increased scope for middle groups, minorities and the poor to
gain influence and exercise scrutiny (Blair 2000). The chance of this happening is greatest
when there are multiple structural channels and mechanisms for ensuring accountability, as in
Bolivia (Blair 2001).
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